Amid debates over initiatives such as Quad and AUKUS, Malaysia and Indonesia are seeking alternative security frameworks based on cooperative principles consistent with ASEAN’s aversion to notions of collective security.

To that end, Malaysian Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein met in March with his Indonesian and Philippine counterparts, Prabowo Subianto and Delfin Lorenzana, to extend their Trilateral Cooperation Agreement (TCA) to enhance national security.

They agreed to expand the TCA by including other organizations and government departments, deploying a permanent trilateral naval officer, improving intelligence sharing to more productively direct operations to monitor regional crime and terrorism and strengthening the strategic engagement between the three States.

The ATT was established in 2017 after terrorist attacks in the city of Marawi and a wave of kidnappings, and it is understood that the cooperation will cover the fight against violent extremism, terrorism and transnational crime. Communication between the partners will be improved as well as greater collaboration between their military forces. These important steps towards countering common threats could not have been imagined two decades ago.

The ATT is one of many minilateral security frameworks to emerge in the Indo-Pacific. Several coastlines in the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca have launched such mechanisms. The Colombo Security Conclave, launched in 2011 and relaunched in 2020, includes India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives – which have transformed their 2013 agreement into a maritime and security agreement – plus Mauritius. The Trilateral Indian Ocean Dialogue involved Australia, India and Indonesia. The India-France-Australia dialogue was established in 2021. The Malacca Strait Patrol in 2004 was established by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in 2004 and joined by Thailand in 2008. It was expanded to include Eyes in the Sky, a combined shipping program. air patrols.

This marks a significant change. Responsibility for maritime security, once the domain of the superpowers, particularly during the Cold War, is now assumed by rising, medium and small powers.

The nations that build these minilateral cadres prefer to steer clear of the machinations of the great powers. Their aim is to reach the most remote corners of their respective maritime sub-regions by carefully mapping threats and vulnerabilities. These developments are not surprising as the major powers can no longer influence events without support. Events in Ukraine have shown that countries must be able to deal with “local” concerns without depending on the diminishing capacity of major powers.

Significantly, the contributing nations broke the bonds of mutual suspicion and, more importantly, the lack of discourse on these issues.

These developments are in stark contrast to the Cold War years in Asia. As a leading regional power, India was totally opposed to any superpower intervention until recently. Other major South Asian nations like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and the Maldives have taken similar positions. Sri Lanka spearheaded the successful initiative to win the support of the United Nations General Assembly to declare the Indian Ocean, together with the air above and the ocean floor, a zone of peace forever.

For decades, the Indian Ocean remained remote from any military cooperation. Mutual suspicions were so high that in the 1990s, when India tried to increase its military capabilities, Indonesia and Australia were alarmed. The situation turned around to the point that Indonesia accepted that India could modernize its port of Sabang.

And while ASEAN was formed in the late 1960s amid security concerns, Cold War politics, Britain’s decision to withdraw from East Suez and elsewhere in Asia, and China’s export of communist ideology, the association has mainly focused on strengthening economic integration and cooperation on addressing non-traditional security issues.

The last attempt to establish a security platform in the conventional sense in this region dates back to the 1960s with the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, but it was relatively short-lived. Today, the only institutions dealing with security issues are the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Broader Maritime Forum and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus. But even these institutions still focus on non-traditional security and the elements of human, cooperative and common security.

However, a lot has changed and it is no surprise that ASEAN members Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have decided to launch a cooperation agreement covering joint sea and air patrols in and around of the seas of Sulu and Sulawesi.

Some might argue that despite recent moves to address the shortcomings of the ACT, cooperation remains focused in a narrow area and there are good reasons for the three countries to strengthen it further.

China is the elephant in the room. From the reclamation and militarization of islands in the South China Sea to the activities of its naval militia and coast guard, China’s assertiveness has been chronicled extensively. A report by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative has mapped the trajectories of Chinese survey vessels across the South China Sea in 2020-2021, revealing considerable activity in waters straddling the coasts and economic zones of the three countries. Malaysia and the Philippines have responded officially to the incursions into their sea and airspace.

Strategic uncertainty and military anxiety about China are common features of maritime trilateral mechanisms in the Indo-Pacific. While the relations between the three ATT countries and China have seen ups and downs over the years, they are gradually converging towards a state of shared complexity in which each has a relationship with China embodied in cooperation with a partner. important economy and concerns about China’s growing assertive behavior. . Even Indonesia has had a run-in with China over the Natuna Islands.

Another issue is Indonesia’s decision to move its capital from Jakarta to Nusantara in East Kalimantan on the island of Borneo, which will require the relocation of civil servants and military personnel. According to one source, 30,000 to 50,000 troops will be deployed to regional commands in the new capital. There will undoubtedly be spin-offs, such as the creation of new businesses to meet growing demand for goods and services. This will not only impact the Indonesian part of Borneo, but also the Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak.

Could the impact also be felt in the southern Philippines, which has long struggled with security and insurgency issues? Given Indonesia’s need to secure its new capital, the TCA could curb illegal immigration and criminal activities such as piracy and smuggling through joint operations.

Huge economic opportunities will be available for enterprising businesses in the three countries. This could be a watershed moment for this area which has always had great potential. We could see new momentum, for example, in the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN growth area, which was created in 1994 to be hampered by its small market, lack of physical connectivity and security concerns.

Malaysia has the most to gain. Even though incidents such as kidnappings have decreased significantly since 2020, security challenges remain, including the threat of kidnapping by sea. Malaysia must also continue to deal with threats from the jihadist group Abu Sayyaf, illegal immigration and smuggling. These are expected to increase once Covid-19 restrictions, particularly on border crossings, are eased. The TCA will do much to address some, if not all, of these issues and ease some of Malaysia’s burden.

The ATT could make a significant contribution to protecting global supply chains through the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca. Another key shipping route runs through the Makassar Strait, giving countries like Australia and New Zealand a more direct route to markets in East Asia. There may one day be an opportunity to expand this agreement through cooperation with Australia and China.

A complication is that Indonesia and the Philippines have outstanding territorial issues with Malaysia, and Malaysia has similar issues with Indonesia, but they are well managed.

Arrangements like the ATT aim for greater collaboration on the sea front, despite unresolved issues and mistrust. The desire to preserve regional stability resulted in inaction. Today, in a more fragmented world, the same goal drives ASEAN member countries towards greater collaboration to safeguard their common interests.